Blindsight and Qualities of Visual Perception Essay -- Expository Rese

Blindsight and Qualities of Visual PerceptionABSTRACT The puzzle of this paper is to defend a broad concept of visual perception, tally to which it is a sufficient condition for visual perception that subjects receive visual information in a way which enables them to give reliably castigate answers about the objects presented to them. According to this view, blindsight, non-epistemic seeing, and conscious visual experience count as proper types of visual perception. This leads to two consequences concerning the role of the phenomenal qualities of visual experiences. First, phenomenal qualities atomic number 18 not necessary in order to see something, because in the subject field of blindsight, subjects can see objects without experiences phenomenal qualities. Second, they cannot be intentional properties, since they are not essential properties of visual experiences, and because the content of visual experiences cannot be established by contingent properties. IntroductionBlin dsight is often understood as encouraging certain claims concerning the function and the status of the phenomenal qualities of visual perceptions. In this chatter I am going to present a short contestation to show that blindsight could not be understood as evidence for these claims. The soil is that blindsight cannot be adequately described as a special case of seeing. Consequently, it is not possible to draw inferences from it concerning the role of the phenomenal qualities for seeing.Visual perceptions are supposed to have two sorts of content. First, they have intentional content which relates them as representations to the external world. The properties that constitute the intentional content are called representational or intentional qualities. Second, visual perce... ... Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 15, 197 - 300 (5) D. Lewis (1986) Veridical Hallucination and prosthetic Vision. In D. Lewis Philosophical Papers. New York et al., Vol. II, 273 - 290 (6) F. Dretske (1969) Seei ng and Knowing. London, 4 - 77 F. capital of Mississippi (1977) Perception. A Representative possible action. Cambridge/Mass., 154 ff. G.J. Warnock (1956) Seeing. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 55, 201 - 218(7) D. Armstrong (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London(8) C. S. Peirce (1986) How to make our Ideas clear. In Writings of Charles S. Peirce. C.J.W. Kloesel (ed.), Bloomington, Vol. III, 257 - 276 G. Ryle (1949) The Concept of Mind. London, Chapter 5(9) D. Armstrong (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London, 209 ff.(10) F. Dretske (1969) Seeing and Knowing. London, 77(11) Dretske (1969), 20 ff. (See footnote 11)